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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to give a brief overview of the organisation and 
functions of entities involved in the provision of social services in the welfare 
market. Public and private not for profit bodies are involved in planning and 
collaborating on the provision of the welfare system. In the particular field of 
social services of general interest, the constant evolution of European law is 
perceived as a source of uncertainty, given that the focus is on the concept of 
“economic activity”. The European Court of Justice has stated that for a given 
service to qualify as an economic activity under internal market rules the 
essential characteristic is that it must be provided for remuneration. The 
economic nature of a service depends not on the legal status of the service 
provider (such as a non-profit making body) nor on the nature of the service, 
but rather on the way a given activity is actually provided, organised and 
financed. Under EU law, this means that social services can be considered as 
economic activities to which internal market rules apply, with no regard for the 
legal status of the provider, which can be a local authority or a ‘for-profit’ or 
‘not-for-profit’ organisation whereas only a truly charitable organisation would 
avoid being bound by European law . 
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1. Introduction.  
 
   As clarified by the European Commission, services of general interest cover 
a wide spectrum of activities, ranging from large corporations in such sectors 
as energy, telecommunications, transport, postal services and education to 
social and health services. 
   These services are regarded as essential to the daily lives of individuals, 
performing an important role in promoting the social, economic and territorial 
cohesion of the European Union, as highlighted by the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union1. 
   Despite the considerable differences, these are services – economic and non- 
economic – on which the public authorities impose specific public service 
obligations and which they classify as ‘of general interest’, to use a term 
recently employed in a specific Protocol of the Treaty of Lisbon2. The 
authorities may decide to carry out the services themselves or to entrust them 
to other undertakings, public3 or private, which may act either for-profit or not- 
for-profit4, with suppliers that operate in partnership with the public 
administration being required to comply with the regulations laid down by the 
EU Treaty and by secondary European law5. 
                                                 
1
 EC Treaty, art. 14 (ex art. 16 TEC). 
2
 Protocol n° 26 on Services of General Interest, Treaty of Lisbon, 2007/C 306/0; Commission 
White Paper on Services of General Interest,  COM (2004) 374; Communication from the 
Commission on the Social Agenda, COM (2005) 33; Commission Green Paper on Services of 
General Interest,  COM (2003) 270; the Commission Report to the Laeken European Council, 
Services of General Interest, COM (2001) 598; Communication from the Commission on 
Services of general interest in Europe, COM (580) 2000; Communication from the 
Commission on  Services of general interest in Europe, COM (96) 443. 
3
 Among public entities there are the ‘in-house providing’ companies: Cavallo Perin R. & 
Casalini D. (2009), Control over In-house Providing Organisations, Public Procurement Law 
Review, 5, 227-241. 
4
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions accompanying the 
Communication on ‘A single market for 21st century Europe’ Services of general interest, 
including social services of general interest: a new European commitment, COM (2007) 725. 
5
 Commission Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community law on public 
contracts and concessions, COM (2004) 327. 
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   Services of general interest may thus be separated into two sub-categories, 
depending on the economic or non-economic nature of the activity they 
perform. The key difference is between services ‘of general economic interest’ 
and ‘non-economic’ services: the supply and organisation of the former 
services are subject to the provisions of the EU Treaty on the internal market 
and competition, since the activity performed is of an economic nature; 
providers of the latter services are not governed by a specific European 
discipline and, in general, are not subject to the rules of the EU Treaty 
regulating competition and the market, although they must still abide by other 
provisions such as the principle of non-discrimination.  
   It is not always easy to distinguish between the two sub-categories since, as 
the European Commission itself points out6, these are often specific situations 
that vary from one Member State to another, even from one local authority to 
another.  
   This is the case of social services in particular, which can sometimes be 
regarded as not being bound by market and competition rules because they are 
provided by bodies acting solely out of a spirit of solidarity (charities, for 
example, and voluntary associations). The Court of Justice of the European 
Union has clarified, however, that it is the actual manner of performance, 
organisation and operation of a given activity that serves to qualify a service as 
economic. 
   Within the sphere of services of general interest, then, social services too 
may be economic or non-economic in nature. The distinction does not depend 
on whether the providers are for-profit bodies, not-for-profit undertakings or 
voluntary associations, which cannot, solely for this reason, avoid having to 
comply with the laws on competition, as will be discussed in this paper. 
 
 
2. Voluntary organisations and the contracting out of social services: a 
comparison between the Italian and the European regulatory systems. 
 
    With particular regard to social services of general interest, it should be 
stressed that the European rules on public procurement do not require public 
authorities to outsource them. As the European Commission correctly pointed 
out on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
they are free to decide to provide the services themselves, directly or in-house. 
They may also decide to provide the service in cooperation with other public 
authorities under the conditions laid down by case law. 
                                                 
6
 COM (2007) 725, supra. 
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   The European rules on public procurement/concession apply only if a public 
authority decides to entrust the provision of a service to a third party in return 
for payment7.  
   Under European regulations, for a given service to be regarded as an 
economic activity according to the rules of the internal market (on the free 
movement of services and freedom of establishment), it must be provided 
against payment. Nevertheless, that service need not necessarily be paid for by 
the beneficiaries. The economic character of a service depends not on the legal 
status of the provider (which may also be a not-for-profit body), nor on the 
nature of the service, but on the actual methods of provision, organisation and 
funding of a given activity8. 
   The Italian rules governing social services have still, as of this date, not made 
a clear distinction between the autonomous initiative of social groupings for 
the provision of private social services of general interest and the contracting 
out of social services of general economic interest to third party organisations 
receiving remuneration for the services they deliver9.  
   It has frequently been affirmed that there exists a ‘preferential assignment’ to 
not-for-profit bodies, for example to social cooperative societies, which have 
come to be seen as of significance in that they are organisations whose 
structure and economic capacity are suited to social services10. Certain social 
services, on the other hand, are provided on the basis of a non-professional 
relationship with the public administration, without provision for remuneration 
for their services. The local authorities may enter into ‘conventions’ with 
voluntary organisations11, which often provide services on their own account 
within the framework of subsidiarity and private autonomy. In these cases, the 
‘convention’ has charitable, fiduciary and coordinating characteristics, and is 
not a source to which a service of general economic interest is contracted. This 
                                                 
7
 Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid,  public procurement and 
the internal market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services 
of general interest, SEC(2010) 1545, December 7th 2010. 
8
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions accompanying the 
Communication on ‘A single market for 21st century Europe’; ‘Services of general interest, 
including social services of general interest: a new European commitment’ COM (2007) 725; 
ECJ, Cases C-357/06, Frigerio Luigi & C. Sncv v. Comune di Triuggio; C-244/94, Fédération 
française des sociétés d’assurance; C-180/98 and C-184/98, Pavlov; C-264/01, C-306/01, C-
354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband. 
9
 For a brief overwiev of the Italian legal system see: Caia G. (2004), I servizi sociali degli enti 
locali e la loro gestione con affidamento a terzi. Premesse di inquadramento, Sanità pubblica 
privata, 355; Cavallo Perin R. (1998), La struttura della concessione di servizio pubblico 
locale, Turin; for an overview of the relations between accreditation, public procurement and 
concession see: Consito M. (2009), Accreditamento e terzo settore, 33 et seq. 
10
 Law 381, 8.11.1991, Disciplina delle cooperative sociali. 
11
 Law 266, 11.8.1991, Legge quadro sul volontariato, art. 7. 
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is how the conclusion of ‘conventions’ without recourse to competitive 
procedures for their award is justified, since the EU Treaty does not ‘preclude a 
Member State from allowing only non-profit-making private operators to 
participate in the running of its social welfare system by concluding contracts 
which entitle them to be reimbursed by the public authorities for the costs of 
providing social welfare services of a health-care nature’12.  
   In certain Italian case-law13 it has been held that voluntary associations are in 
a special position, that of an aid to public administration, without in any way 
being assimilated to market logic. The result is that they cannot take part in 
tender procedures or be awarded concessions against payment for the services 
to be performed, since the financial resources from which they may 
legitimately benefit are restricted to the reimbursement of the expenses they 
incur. An invitation to tender for public contracts that is addressed both to 
undertakings operating on the market and to voluntary organisations is 
therefore not held to be possible, since the latter may only supplement the 
potential offered by the former by means of the above-mentioned system of 
direct contractual arrangements with reimbursement by the authorities. 
   According to this interpretation of the law, when a public authority intends to 
contract out social services it is required to issue a public call for tenders only 
from professional organisations, to the exclusion of voluntary associations. In 
Italy, therefore, it is commonly held that these associations are not market 
operators as they are bound by their self-imposed constraints of social 
solidarity, so that their activities are conducted outside the competitive sphere 
in that they are not profit-making.  
   As found at European level, however, the fact that such associations do not 
aim to make a profit does not preclude them from engaging in an economic 
activity and, in this respect, they constitute undertakings within the meaning of 
the rules of the Treaty as they pertain to competition14. The associations in 
                                                 
12
 ECJ, Case C-70/95, Sodemare SA; Interpretative Communication of the Commission on the 
Community Law applicable to Public Procurement and the possibilities for integrating social 
considerations into Public Procurement COM(566) 2001; the leading case is: ECJ, Case 
C-31/87, Beentjes BV.   
13
 Italian Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts for works, services, and supplies, 
Opinion 17.12.2008, n. 266; Cons. Stato, sez. V, 10.5.2005 n. 2345; TAR Campania, sez. I, 
2.4.2007, n. 3021; TAR P iemonte,  sez.  I I ,  12.6 .2006,  n.  2323;  TAR P iemonte ,  sez .  
I I ,  31.3 .2006,  n.1604;  TAR Campania, sez. I, 21.3.2006, n. 3109; TAR Piemonte, sez. II, 
18.4.2005, n. 1043; TAR Veneto, sez. I, 3.3.2004, n. 481; TAR Basilicata, 29.11.2003, n. 1022; 
TAR Lombardia, sez. III, 9.3.2000, n. 1869. 
14
 ECJ, Cases C-41/90, Höfner and Elser; C-244/94, Fédération française des sociétés 
d'assurance et al.; C-67/96, Albany; C-115/97-C-117/97, Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming; 
C-219/97, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken; C-180/98-C-184/98, Pavlov et al.; C-264/01, 
C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al.; C-222/04, Cassa di risparmio 
di Firenze; C-119/06, EU Commission v. Italian Republic; C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale 
Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (CoNISMa) v. Regione Marche; C-49/07, 
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question, then, may engage in an economic activity in competition with other 
professional operators, insofar as it is the existence of payment for the service 
that establishes the economic nature of the services delivered (irrespective of 
whether that payment is made by the users of the public service, by the 
awarding authority or by parties extraneous to the principal public service 
relationship between the provider and user).   
   According to the European Court of Justice, the fact that the organisations in 
question can submit tenders at prices appreciably lower than those of other, 
unsubsidised, tenderers, since those who work for them act on a voluntary 
basis, does not prevent them from taking part in a procedure for the award of 
public procurement contracts15. It is the existence of remuneration in return for 
the service that reveals the existence of the award of a public contract or a 
concession and, therefore, of an economic service of general interest, so that 
the public body intending to contract out the performance of social service is 
then subject to the European Union regulations on public procurement for the 
protection of competition.  This applies even when the potential providers 
enjoy a legal capacity that, for other purposes, qualifies them as initiatives of 
citizens, whether individuals or in partnership, for the provision of non-
economic services of general interest (see Italian Constitution, article 118(4).  
   A party, then, may compete with other operators for part of the activities it 
performs and at the same time be engaged in non-economic activities in which 
it acts as a welfare or charitable body16. 
 
 
3. The conduct of a non-economic activity: the case of charities. 
 
   From their very origins, social services have established themselves as 
providers of aid to combat poverty or to alleviate the situations of need and 
difficulty that people may encounter in the course of their lives. It was 
philanthropy that inspired the earliest social welfare measures, the feature of 
which was the co-existence of public and private initiatives17. These were the 
expressions of a spirit of civic voluntarism, something regarded as peculiar to 
the New World in particular18, which were later to develop into the ‘private 
social sector’.  
                                                                                                                                 
Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE); C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner. 
Recently Italian case law began to follow the European case law: Cons. Stato, sez. I, 
31.3.2010, n. 1278; Cons. Stato, sez. VI, 16.6.2009, n. 3897; see also Italian Authority for the 
Supervision of Public Contracts for works, services, and supplies, Opinion 21.10.2010, n. 7. 
15
 ECJ, Case C-94/99, ARGE. 
16
 ECJ, Cases C-222/04, Cassa di risparmio di Firenze; C-118/85, Commission v. Italy. 
17
 Heilborn S. E. (2008-2009), Book review: The Faithless fiduciary and the quest for 
charitable accountability, 1200-2005, 43 Real. Prop. Tr. And Est. L. J., 797. 
18
 De Tocqueville A. (1848), De la Démocratie en Amérique, Paris, 214. 
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   It was in this context that the distinction originated between not-for-profit 
and non-profit entities; this has arisen from the gradual affirmation of 
organisations with the shared objective of deriving no personal profit for 
members and administrators and therefore not pursuing a monetary goal19. 
These are parties that do not operate for pecuniary profit, the distinctive feature 
of which is the ‘non distribution constraint’20.  
   The qualification of an organisation as not-for-profit does not imply an 
absolute prohibition on engaging in activities that are, to a certain extent, 
profitable. Earnings, profits and net incomes are not forbidden in themselves, 
provided that profit is not the main reason for setting up the organisation and 
that provision is made for the devolution and redeployment of profit towards 
the pursuit of activities of social value, in accordance with the organisation’s 
statutes.  
   The prohibition on using the organisation for direct financial gain, in other 
words the pursuit of a monetary goal, is the element on which the distinction 
from for-profit or business corporations is based21. 
   A not-for-profit body is regarded as preferable to its for-profit parallel, which 
is created for the pursuit of a business purpose as its main object, since it may 
be less prone to exploiting the lack of evaluation capacity among potential 
recipients (‘information asymmetry’) 22.  
   The not-for-profit category covers widely differing entities that may or may 
not be entrepreneurial in nature. The examples that come to mind are hospitals, 
universities, research institutes, symphony orchestras, sports clubs, voluntary 
associations, cooperative societies, museums, healthcare units, care homes or 
day nurseries, to quote just a few. Their shared element is that their main 
intention is to pursue a socially useful goal without a pecuniary goal, which 
should not be confused with the exclusion of a possible entrepreneurial 
character of the organisations concerned.  
   Within the not-for-profit ‘genus’, then, numerous organisational ‘species’ 
may be discerned, and these can be differentiated by the objectives of social 
                                                 
19
 Schoenfeld M. (1970), Federal Taxation and Non-Profit Organizations, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev., 
290, 291. 
20
 Hansmann H.B. (1980), The role of nonprofit enterprise, 89 Yale L.J., 838. 
21
 The basic question to be asked in determining whether a corporation is “nonprofit” is 
whether the corporation is being exploited for direct monetary gain: People v. Arnold¸ 37 Colo. 
App. 414, 553 P2d 79; Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations, § 68.05. 
22
 Rose Ackerman S. (1996), Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, J. Ec. Lit., 716, 722, 
723; Hansmann H.B., The role of nonprofit enterprise, supra, 847, 872; James E., Rose 
Ackerman S. (1986), The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economies, Chur: Harwood 
Academic Press, 20-23; Steinberg R., Gray B. H. (1993), ‘The role of Nonprofit Enterprise’ in 
1993: Hansmann revisited,  Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quart., 22, 297 et seq.; Salamon 
L. M. (2002), The State of Nonprofit America, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
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value at which they aim, their organisational structure and the presence or 
absence of the nature of an enterprise. 
   As has been pointed out, the fact of not pursuing monetary gain should not be 
confused with the conduct or non-conduct of an economic activity. In the same 
way, the non-distribution of profits and operating surpluses and their 
channelling towards the performance of the organisation’s stated activity or 
towards increasing its assets should not be confused with its lack of an 
economic nature.  
   Although, in ontological terms, enterprises pursuing pecuniary goals cannot 
be attributed to the ‘genus’ in question, there are nonetheless organisations 
structured in the form of an enterprise as well as organisations that are not so 
structured, in which there is a shared goal of social value, that are an 
expression of that ‘genus’23. 
   Since the common factor in the category is the particular object pursued, the 
procedures whereby it is intended to pursue that object can become a useful 
element in making an internal distinction.  
   Entities can thus be identified the main part of whose funds, if not the whole 
of their funding, comes from donations and subsidies of varying kinds; others 
may operate on a basis of mutuality, through payment of enrolment fees or 
subscriptions or prices. 
   Within the confines of this paper it would not be feasible to extend the 
analysis of the possible models, although these could be separated into two 
categories depending on the whether or not the entities concerned are 
entrepreneurial in nature.  
   Certain not-for-profit entities can thus be defined as social enterprises, in that 
they are engaged principally and in a stable manner in an organised economic 
activity for the purpose of the production or exchange of goods and services of 
social value in order to attain objectives of general interest.  
   Beside these, there are organisations that pursue the same objectives of social 
value in a non-economic manner and that, as such, have no entrepreneurial 
character since they do not intend to produce goods or services directed 
towards the market.  
                                                 
23
 The border between not-for-profit and for-profit is not always clear-cut, if attention is 
directed only towards the activity performed, since operators can be found in the same sector 
that belong to one category or the other. An example is the case of hospitals, which came into 
being as institutions ‘where the poor could come to die’ (charitable bodies) but which at the 
end of the twentieth century also developed into a for-profit format: Fishman J. J. (2008), 
Wrong Way Corrigan and recent developments in the nonprofit landscape: a need for new 
legal approaches, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 569; Kenney E. D. (1994), Private accreditation as a 
substitute for direct government regulation in public health insurance programs: when is it 
appropriate?, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 50.  
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   In this respect, there is a re-awakening of interest in a proposal to qualify 
welfare bodies or charities24 as separate non-profit bodies and as a sub-
category25 of the broader not-for-profit sector.  
   Although the two terms (not-for-profit and non-profit) are often confused and 
used as synonyms, according to this different profile a distinction that is 
sometimes proposed between bodies that are ‘merely not-for-profit’ and ‘non-
profit’ bodies becomes of interest; adopting this distinction, the latter category 
would come under the heading of charities in a narrow sense26.  
   The semantic difference has been taken up at certain historic moments, for 
instance by the US legislator in differentiating between cases in which a profit 
is possible, even though it is not the main purpose pursued by an organisation, 
and other cases in which, on the other hand, the purpose is exclusively 
charitable, almost as if it is wished to assert, in the latter assumptions, the 
impossibility of performing activities of an economic nature and defining only 
these bodies as ‘truly charitable corporations’27.  
   From this is derived a functional classification that is sometimes discussed: 
whereas not-for-profit can also be incorporated for business purposes, although 
the purpose must not be for pecuniary profit or financial benefit, other entities 
are coming into being to pursue non-economic objectives in that they are 
public or charitable purposes (i.e. not-for-business). 
                                                 
24
 Furnishing board, lodging and nursing to needy persons is among the most familiar and 
useful of charities, and that which constitutes such an institution as a charity is that it does not 
furnish these things for profit: Gooch v. Association for Relief of Aged Indigent Females, 109 
Mass. 558, 567 (1872). The terminology referring to charities and not-for-profit organisations 
is complicated: Hansmann H. B. (1980), op. cit., 835. 
25
 Charities are a sub-category of the genus not-for-profit and not all not-for-profits are 
charities: Gary S.N. (1999), Regulating the management of charities: trust law, corporate law, 
and tax law, 21 U. Hawai’i L. R. 593; Kirby v. Columbian Institute¸101 NJ Super 205, 243 
A2d 853 N.J.Co (1968); Presbyterian Homes of Synod of New Jersey v. Division of Tax 
Appeals, 55 NJ 275, 261 A2d 143, NJ (1970). 
26
 Oleck H.L. (1970), Non-profit types, Uses, and abuses: 1970, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev., 207, 212; 
a not for profit corporation can make a profit. The point is that is not organized for the purpose 
of making a profit: Pasley R. S. (1970), Organization and Operation of Non-Profit 
Corporations - Some General Considerations, ibid; Weeks J. K. (1970), The Not-for-profit 
Business Corporation, ibid., 303.  
27
 V. the Ohio Revised Code, now abrogated, made a distinction between a ‘corporation which 
is not formed for the pecuniary gain or profit of, and whose net earnings or any part thereof are 
not distributable to, its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons; provided, 
however, that the payment of reasonable compensation for services rendered and the 
distribution of assets on dissolution as permitted by services rendered and the distribution of 
assets on dissolution (…) shall not be deemed pecuniary gain or profit or distribution of 
earnings» and «charitable corporation (…) organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals’: Sec. 1702.01, C and D. 
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  Charities in the traditional sense can be related to this latter hypothesis, 
understood as being ‘non-profit’ entities28.  
   Here the point at issue is the actual nature of the charitable activities, since 
they are directed towards ends such as education, health and social welfare, 
which it is considered cannot always be effectively pursued through normal 
recourse to the market, since these are often activities that are not economically 
oriented29. 
   Even if it is not the intention that organisations dedicated to charitable 
purposes should be limited to the sole purpose of serving the poor30 by offering 
services, food, shelter and means of subsistence, such organisations that deliver 
services and benefits to users in impoverished conditions or in difficulties do 
not become market operators, since no supply and demand relationship exists 
that would mean that they could be qualified as such operators.  
   The potential gratuitousness of the services and goods offered becomes a 
distinctive element of the activity performed, where the costs for their delivery 
are covered by funding, whether public31 or private (grants, legacies or 
donations32), that is non-refundable and therefore cannot be defined as 
remuneration for the service offered. 
                                                 
28
 These are bodies for which it is not sufficient that the profit motive is a subordinate goal, but 
where the organisation needs to eliminate from its basic aims any intention whatsoever to make 
a profit. 
29
 Weeks J. K. (1970), op. cit., 313. 
30
 Fishman J.J. (2008), op. cit., 570, 574, 578 nt. 55; Colombo J. D. (2006-2007), Federal and 
State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and Healthcare for the Poor, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 
433; Abrams S. Y. (1998-1999), Devolution’s discord: resolving operational dissonance with 
the UBIT exemptions, 17 Yale L. and Pol’y Rev. 886, 890; Zollmann C. (1924), American Law 
of Charities, Milwaukee, 121. On the differing role performed by private organisations in a 
welfare state and in a liberal state, see Whitman J. Q (1991), Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the 
First New Deal, 39 Am. J. Comp. L., 747.  
31
 Questions arise in the face of possible tensions between public funding and the acts of 
discrimination sometimes committed by ideologically oriented charities; for the U.S. see 
Brennen D. A. (2001), Tax Expenditure, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope 
of Civil Right Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, BYU L. Rev., 167; Brennen D. A. 
(2000), The Power of The Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy and ‘Charity’ in 
Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev., 389.  
32
 Charities are encouraged to generate income through donations, government grants, and the 
implicit tax subsidy of the “income exemption”: Abrams S. Y. (1998-1999), op. cit., 885; 
Hansmann H. B. (1980), op. cit., 835, 836-837. The exemption was important because private 
contributions were the largest single source of revenue for not-for- profit charitable 
organisations: Weeks J. K. (1970), op. cit., 309. It has been suggested that the category in 
question be redefined by limiting it to organisations receiving a given amount of their budget 
from gifts and donations: Fishman J.J. (2008), op. cit., 570; Hall M.H., Colombo J.D. (1991), 
The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 Ohio St. L. J. 1379.  
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   These are organisations whose activity is bound by a constraint, perhaps 
structural, implying an obligation not to operate for the market; in other words, 
the activities they perform should by preference be directed towards the poor, 
the needy and those in difficulties, with the performance of even collateral for-
profit activities being prohibited33.  
   As of this date it is not clear if that preclusion is a constraint that is 
unavailable for truly charitable corporations which, unlike not-for-profit 
organisations, would find it hard to justify commercial activities that could be 
qualified as ‘substantially correlated’34 to the main activity. Only entirely 
occasional and negligible commercial activities may be permitted, as in the 
case of the sale of small artefacts hand-made by the residents in a sheltered 
home for the disabled. In such circumstances, the industrial – in that it is 
standardised – nature of the collateral activity does not affect the non-
entrepreneurial nature of the organisation, and therefore the non-economic 
character of the activity performed.  
   Non-profit organisations may sometimes be intended for only the indirect 
performance of socially significant activities through the distribution of 
incomes derived from the administration of their own assets and donations 
received for that end35. Here again, this hypothesis does not appear to cast 
doubt on the absence of any qualification as market operators, since the activity 
performed may be to support the demand – including support by donations to 
the users – in a market operated by others. 
 
 
4. Conclusions. 
                                                 
33
 Malani A., Posner E. A. (2007), The case for for-profit charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017; see 
also Schill M. H. (1983-1984), The Participation of Charities in limited Partnerships, 93 Yale 
L.J., 1355. 
34
 The continuance of the qualification as a charity calls for a substantive relationship to be 
demonstrated between the service offered/sold and the object of social value to be attained; the 
outcome of such a demonstration is rarely satisfactory for a charity in the strict sense of the 
term, but rather it often leads to its not-for-profit status being revoked and therefore to the loss 
of its tax exemption. See Abrams S. Y. (1998-1999), op. cit., 885, nt. 62 and 63; Brennen D. A. 
(2007-2008), The Commerciality Doctrine as Applied to the Charitable Tax Exemption for 
Homes for the Aged: State and Local perspectives, 76 Fordham L. rev. 833; Colombo J.D. 
(2007-2008), Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial Activity by 
Charities, ibid., 667. 
35
 This could be the hypothesis of the United Charities, whose object is raising and handling 
funds: Notes - United Charities and the Sherman Act, 91 Yale L.J. 1593, 1981-1982; Rose 
Ackerman S. (1980), United Charities: An Economic Analysis, 28 Pub. Pol'y 323; see also 
Abrams S. Y. (1998-1999), op. cit., 887. For an Italian example see: Legislative Decree 207, 
4.5.2001, Riordino del sistema delle istituzioni pubbliche di assistenza e beneficenza, a norma 
dell'articolo 10 della legge 8 novembre 2000, n. 328, art. 15, which relates to Italian charitable 
institutions called Istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza ed assistenza.  
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   It has been pointed out that an economic activity or enterprise within the 
meaning of the EU Treaty is such that the intervention of the State is strictly 
regulated by the competition laws, or even prohibited outright36, and for the 
purpose of its qualification the legal status of the service provider is not 
relevant.  
   For truly charitable corporations, on the other hand, State aid is customary, 
provided that it does not dissimulate the remuneration of a service of general 
economic interest but rather serves as a favour, support and backing for non-
economic activities regarded as of social value and of interest to the 
community37. 
    A uniform definition of the not-for-profit and non-profit sector as a ‘social 
enterprise’ does not seem to be possible, given that the enterprise within the 
meaning of the EU Treaty presupposes an economic activity, the existence of a 
market and therefore an exchange of services whose essence and ultimate aim 
is to guarantee the continued existence of one of the parties on the market itself 
(the consumers) as a condition for the existence of the other (the enterprise). 
   Such a presumption cannot be held to be true of purely non-profit bodies, 
whose aim on the other hand is gradually to overcome the individuals’ 
situations of need and difficulties, and thereby to remove the reasons for the 
existence of the organisation and to wind up its activities.  
   For example, the elimination of the category of the poor is expressed as the 
affirmation of a goal whose attainment would simultaneously do away with the 
objects of the organisation for which it has been set up, which it accompanies 
by the objective of implementing the equal protection clause, in other words 
the creation of the conditions for the full development of the human person and 
the safeguarding of human dignity. 
                                                 
36
 The EC Treaty generally prohibits State aid: art. 107 (ex art. 87 TEC). 
37
 In this connection, of possible interest is the U.S. Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996, § 104, known as welfare reform, which inserts what it 
calls ‘charitable choice’, ‘a provision allowing states to direct their share of federal dollars to 
religious organizations, including houses of worship. Under charitable choices, states can 
contract with religious organizations to deliver welfare benefits; states also give individual 
vouchers that can be redeemed for benefits at private, including religious entities. The statute 
also allows states to contract with for-profit companies to administer their welfare programs’: 
Minow M. (2003), Partners, Not Rivals. Privatization and the Public Good, Boston, 1 et seq. 
On the broad meaning of the term ‘contract’ referred to here, see Freeman J. (2000), The 
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 595, 596; for an overview on 
Government-Nonprofit relations: Salamon L. M. (1995), Partners in Public Service: 
Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press; Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies (2003), Policy Tools and 
Government Performance, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies; for 
a recent reading see also Freeman J., Minow M. (2009), Government by Contract: Outsourcing 
and American Democracy, Harvard University Press. 
